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‘This Place Used to be a White British
Boys’ Club’: Reporting Dynamics and
Cultural Clash at an International
News Bureau in Nairobi
MEL BUNCE
University of Oxford, Oxford, UK
ABSTRACT Africa has long been portrayed by Western media as a dark and conflict-ridden
continent. Such reports have traditionally been produced by white journalists in the field, writing
for a distant audience ‘back home’. In recent years, significant structural changes in the foreign
news industry have seen the near-demise of foreign correspondents and the increasing use of
locally hired journalists. This research explores the increasingly important role of local
correspondents in the production of international news reports, and asks whether their presence
may start to change how Africa is depicted in the West. This investigation is framed by a cultural
analysis of the Reuters newsroom in Nairobi during the post-election crisis of 2007–08. This
newsroom provides a microcosm of the media industry, in which Western and local journalists
disagreed and debated the role of the media in a crisis. This clash of values offers a springboard
for exploring the potential ability of local national journalists to shape the news: Do they have the
power to challenge Western reporting modes, or are they simply reproducing the values of this
system? This article concludes that the current situation is somewhere between the two:
Westerners continue to dominate international reporting, but there are indications that a slow and
sometimes uncomfortable synthesis is beginning to emerge.
KEY WORDS: media, Kenya, international newsgathering, conflict, post-election violence,
tribalism, Reuters, colonialism, Al Jazeera
Introduction
For hundreds of years, British explorers, military personnel, researchers and writers
have travelled to Africa and sent home stories of the different and dangerous lands
they found. In early reports, the continent was often represented as an unremittingly
bleak and brutal place, whose inhabitants were uncivilised and ‘other’ to the people
of Europe. Contemporary critics of the international news media argue that,
centuries later, little has changed.
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
Correspondence Address: Mel Bunce, University of Oxford, Oxford, UK. 1
Email: Melanie.bunce@politics.ox.ac.uk or mealanie.bunce@gtc.ox.ac.uk
CE: PG: kothandamk 20/8/10 20:36 CTRT_A_509950 (XML)
The Round Table
Vol. 99, No. 410, 497–510, October 2010
ISSN 0035-8533 Print/1474-029X Online/10/050497-14 ! 2010 The Round Table Ltd
DOI: 10.1080/00358533.2010.509950
British news reports, commentators suggest, continue to present Africa in a
negative light—highlighting disaster, simplifying and stereotyping ethnic groups, and
championing internationally-led rescue efforts (Franks, 2005). Rather than a
relationship of equals—or the family analogy favoured in contemporary Common-
wealth discourse—Britain’s news media continues to represent her former colonies in
a paternalistic, negative and even ‘neo-colonial’ light, with disproportionate
repercussions for trade, tourism and international relations (Mbembe, 2001).
The news coverage of the Kenyan election violence in 2007–08 appears to be an
archetypal example of reporting in this mode, with much of the coverage generalising
violence across the country, failing to contextualise events, and frequently presenting
the complex political, economic and cultural crisis as a bloody and inevitable tribal
clash (Somerville, 2009). However, in the midst of this conflict, locally hired
journalists—who have become increasingly important to the production of
international news as the importance of the overseas foreign correspondent has
declined—began to challenge these negative and sensationalising norms. This
research explores the ensuing fragmented debate inside the newsroom over the
media’s role in a crisis, and asks whether the presence of local correspondents may
start to change how Africa is depicted in the West.
Supported by a Round Table Commonwealth Award for Young Scholars, I spent
August and September 2009 in Nairobi, interviewing journalists who work for
British outlets and exploring these issues. The conclusions of this paper are
particularly informed by eight weeks’ close study of the Nairobi bureau of the
Reuters1 newswire, including observation of news meetings and reporter interaction
as well as in-depth interviews. This fieldwork produced original data that shed light
on the experiences of foreign correspondents in the field and the individual,
organisational and external factors that influence their work.
The article begins with a short background of the Kenyan post-election violence
and the news media’s coverage of these events. It then briefly explores some of the
literature on foreign correspondents in the field. The body of the article analyses the
ethos of the Reuters Nairobi bureau in reference to the post-election coverage. It
explores what was distinct about reporting, and what—or whose—values drove the
production. Finally, it concludes with a discussion of the importance of values
clashes in the overseas newsroom: Are the days of foreign correspondence as a
‘colonial boys’ club’ numbered?
Background
Despite the cliche´d notion of a dashing foreign correspondent in the field—far
away from home and battling adversity to uncover the truth (Peterson, 2001)—the
reality of day-to-day international newsgathering in East Africa is considerably
more mundane. The past 30 years have witnessed a systematic downsizing of the
number of foreign correspondents posted around the world (Hamilton and Jenner,
2004). This trend has been particularly marked in Africa, where most outlets have
no correspondents of any kind and rely heavily on the newswires to provide their
stories (Franks, 2005). Today only five UK newspapers have traditional,
permanently posted correspondents based in East Africa.2 The vast majority of
news on East Africa is now produced by journalists working for a handful of
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major newswires and networks that have bureaux in Nairobi, the largest of which
are the BBC, CNN and Al Jazeera, and the newswires Reuters, AP and AFP. A
significant portion of the journalists hired by these newsrooms are not away from
home at all, but rather locally hired Kenyans who report on their own country for
international news consumers. The stories produced in these international bureaux
are more important than ever, as they provide news coverage for the vast majority
of international newspapers, TV channels and radio stations around the world, and
are the primary source of information about Africa for most British citizens
(DFID, 2000).
Despite the clear significance of these organisations, there has been little scholarly
interest in their practices and the factors that influence foreign news production;
perhaps, wrote Oliver Boyd-Barrett (2000), because newswires occupy a less
romantic space in our imaginings, as compared with the rugged and dashing
correspondents who appear in films and popular culture. Particularly neglected has
been the role of local national journalists in the production of news.
This article contributes to filling this lacuna in the literature through an
exploration of one particular newsroom, the Reuters bureau in Nairobi, and its
distinctive composition, dynamics and news values. To focus the analysis, it explores
a case study of reporting on the Kenya post-election crisis of 2007–08. This period
was a dramatic anomaly in Kenyan news coverage and does not represent day-to-
day reporting practices. However, it provides an informative example foregrounding
many key issues of journalistic production, as the newsroom journalists negotiated
(or failed to negotiate) how the crisis should be covered.
The Context
On 30 December 2007, incumbent Mwai Kibaki was declared the winner of the
Kenyan presidential election, amid widespread claims of vote-rigging from both
local and international electoral monitors. Within the hour, supporters of Kibaki’s
opponent, Raila Odinga of the Orange Democratic Movement, began rioting
across the country and attacking Kibaki supporters. The violence began as an
expression of outrage at the fraudulent elections, but quickly became ethnically
oriented, with Luo (Odinga’s tribe) mobs venting their anger on Kikuyu (Kibaki’s
tribe) neighbours, and Kikuyu youths assembling to take revenge against any non-
Kikuyu in their residential areas. Violence peaked with the killing of over 30
unarmed civilians in a church near Eldoret on New Year’s Day. By the end of
February 2008, post-election violence had left more than 1,200 dead and some
350,000 displaced.
The post-election violence displayed what the International Crisis Group (2008,
p. 1) termed ‘a serious ethnic character’—but ethnic differences were by no means the
single root cause of the conflict. Tribal groupings have long been politicised and
manipulated in Kenya by elites, from their construction during colonial contact
through to contemporary politics of ethnic nepotism and exclusion. Today, there is a
widespread perception that the ruling party’s tribal peers receive preferential access
to state resources. In December 2007, these grievances combined with weak political
institutions, the normalisation of violence and conflict among elites to create the
foundations of the crisis (Cheeseman, 2008, p. 170).
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News Coverage of the Post-election Violence
The violence immediately captured the attention of the global news media.
Unusually for an African news story, reports on the crisis reached the front pages
of newspapers and were broadcast at the start of television and radio news bulletins
around the world. Even more unusually, interest in the crisis was relatively long-
lived, and it continued to receive a high level of attention throughout January and
into February 2008.3
The content of international news coverage of the crisis has been fiercely criticised
by both Kenyan and international commentators. Two critiques, in particular, have
dominated the post-mortem analyses. First, it is claimed that coverage exaggerated
the scale and severity of the violence. As one Kenyan reporter told the BBC World
Service Trust (2008, p. 14) investigators, ‘I watched the BBC and I thought this
country was on fire. CNN was playing the same clip from Kibera as if it was a
commercial. Part of what I saw was sensational [and created fear]’. The most explicit
exaggerations were by articles that employed the term ‘genocide’, comparing
Kenya’s violence to the cataclysmic events of Rwanda in 1994; they reduced the crisis
to an ‘atavistic inevitability’, and potentially stoked anger and fear (Somerville,
2009). The international news outlets showed little restraint in broadcasting the most
explicit images, including ‘burning houses, scared people on the move, and even
people hacked to death’ (Ogola, 2008). In some cases, these images were presented
without any explanation of their content, conveying the sense that the whole country
was in a state of senseless anarchy.
Second, the international coverage was accused of employing tribal language that
was incorrect, condescending and potentially inflammatory. Keith Somerville (2009,
p. 530) noted that in the UK media the election violence was presented almost
exclusively as resulting from long-standing tribal hatred, with scant reference to even
the political parties that were the source of much of the tension. The use of tribal
language in reports concerned analysts, who felt this framing generated misleading
descriptions, gave insufficient explanations of the violence, and had pejorative and
primitive connotations (Anderson, 2008; Keane, 2008; Somerville, 2009). Finally, the
tribal language concerned many Kenyan commentators, who worried that the
language was inflammatory, particularly when international coverage became a
crucial source of information for Kenyans themselves after the government banned
local media houses from live broadcasting.
Divergent Approaches and Conflicting News Values
In Kenya, the local mainstream media (TV, press and radio owned by the two main
media houses) adopted a very different, very reserved approach to reporting.
Concerned not to exacerbate the violence, journalists refrained from naming the
different tribes involved in fighting, and chose to describe clashes as occurring between
different ‘communities’. Speaking to the BBCWorld Service Trust (2008, p. 8), Farida
Karoney, a Kenyan reporter, stated her outlet’s position: ‘Here at KTN, when we are
reporting conflict we will not refer to people by their tribe because we think that such
tribal references will entrench feelings of hate’. On 3 January 2008,Kenya’s two biggest
competing newspapers, The Nation and The Standard, ignored their commercial
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agendas in a show of unity for peace, and published a jointly negotiated edition with a
common editorial front page, reading ‘Save Our Beloved Country’.
This local coverage contrasts starkly with international reporters’ work, and
strong differences of opinions are still articulated today. Kenyan journalists argue
that the international reporters demonstrated little concern for the well-being of
Kenya or Kenyans, and were simply trying to break another story for professional
gain. Kenyan journalist-academic George Ogola (2008 2), for example, wrote:
It was not a desire by a section of the international media to tell the world the
true story about the conflict that was slowly consuming Kenya. This was about
a good story; it was about the exploitation of a people crying out for help.
International journalists, meanwhile, are defensive; they accuse local journalists of
adopting a conservative approach that did little to air the issues underlying the
conflict.
Underlying this clash is a fundamental disagreement on what the role of the news
media should be during a crisis. Kenyan journalists describe an important ethical
obligation to the peace process itself, and argue that the media should not produce
reports that are potentially inflammatory, whether they are intended for a primarily
local or international audience. This position is sometimes referred to in com-
munications literature as ‘peace journalism’ or ‘conflict-sensitive journalism’
(Gultang, 2000; Hanitzsch, 2004), and is often presented as being in direct
competition with traditional ‘hard news’ reporting (Fawcett, 2002). While
‘traditional’ reporting values suggest that journalists should draw attention to
important developments in a conflict, ‘peace journalism’ suggests that journalists
should draw attention away from any developments that could fuel fear or create
further tension (Ross, 2008 3). Whether these two ends are inherently antithetical is an
issue that became particularly relevant in the post-election coverage.
Research Questions and Literature Review
Many interesting questions emerge from this overview. In what mode, and why, did
the Nairobi Reuters bureau produce reporting? Second, how did the bureau—which
hires both Kenyan and international journalists—negotiate the post-election crisis:
were there value clashes in this newsroom, and if so, how were they resolved?
Oliver Boyd-Barrett is one of the few academics to explore contemporary
newswires in the global news industry. Over his body of work, he constructs a
macroanalysis of these newswire bureau networks, focusing on hiring patterns,
global span and structural hierarchies. Boyd-Barrett’s (1980) survey of news agency
journalists showed there were many more locally recruited journalists than
expatriates in overseas bureaux, but that bureau chiefs were generally nationals of
the agencies’ home countries (i.e. Britain, America or France) or nationals of other
Western or Commonwealth countries. Bureau leadership by expatriates was justified
in terms of expatriates’ presumably better sense of the news interests of media
audiences back ‘home’ and their native command of the main language of
distribution. Non-local journalists dominated top positions and had editorial
control over their bureaux. Boyd-Barrett (2000) concluded that, in its original form,
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the bureau conforms to a colonialist outpost model, whereby expatriate command
and communications between expatriate communities and the mother country are
privileged and the ‘whites’ are surrounded by compliant servants.
Boyd-Barrett did not, however, explore how these newsrooms are negotiated by
the journalists who occupy them; and it is unclear what these structural relations
mean in practice for news production on the ground. Furthermore, by focusing on
these structural features, he leaves little room in his analysis for the possibility that
local journalists may challenge these structures in the field. This research explores
whether Boyd-Barrett’s prediction holds true in the Nairobi Reuters office: Was the
hierarchy of the newsroom structured around firmly hierarchical, colonial lines?
And, in practice, how did this influence news values and decisions in the bureau?
Exploring the Newsroom: Methodology
In August and September 2009, I interviewed 10 journalists working on news
production in the Reuters bureau in Nairobi, including the bureau chief, deputy
chief, correspondents, and a number of stringers (casually contracted journalists
paid per story). This sample captured nearly the full news team at this point in time,4
and included a cross-section of nationalities: four Kenyans, three British, one
Australian, one Ugandan and one Somali. In addition to these interviews, I spent
eight weeks attending news meetings, observing interactions and talking informally
with the journalists in the office.
To offer a counter-perspective and hear from journalists outside Reuters, I
interviewed an additional 23 journalists from a range of competing outlets:
representatives from the BBC, Al Jazeera, AFP, AP and Xinhau newswires; and a
wide range of journalists at British, European and American magazines and
newspapers.5 Some journalists were happy speaking on the record, whereas others
asked to remain anonymous. These interviews were semi-structured, and covered the
newsgathering process, reporters’ news values, and their relationships with
colleagues, editors and sources. If the journalist had been in Nairobi at the time,
they discussed the 2007–08 post-election violence.
The Ethos of a Nairobi Bureau: Insiders and Outsiders
This section gives an overview of the Nairobi Reuters office and examines the work its
journalists did during the post-election violence. In general, journalists felt they had
done a positive, professional job reporting the crisis. However, it was a very
demanding time for the staff, and there was a variety of tensions among the
journalists. Divides emerged along two main fracture lines: first, between ethnic/
political groupings in the office; and second, between local and international
journalists regarding the news and angles they wished to report. The cultural
dimensions of these divides are explored.
‘A Leader in the Region’: The Daily Work of the Reuters Newswire
Reuters is the largest newswire in Nairobi, at that time employing six text
journalists, four television journalists, two full-time photographers, and a
240
245
250
255
260
265
270
275
280
502 M. Bunce
fluctuating number of stringers. In Nairobi, AFP and AP—Reuters’ two biggest
competitors for hard news production—hire only half this number of staff. The
staff represented a range of nationalities, with Kenyans making up the largest
group. However, as Boyd-Barrett’s work predicted, the managerial positions were
filled by Western nationals—the bureau chief, deputy chief and a senior
correspondent were British; the highest position held by a Kenyan national was
senior economic correspondent. In addition, there were five Kenyan journalists, a
South African television producer, a Ugandan humanitarian correspondent and an
Australian stringer.
The Nairobi office is the regional hub of Reuters reporting on East Africa;
journalists in the office produce news on Kenya and 14 other countries in the region,6
drawing on a large network of stringers and journalists in the field.7 Bureau chief
Andrew Cawthorne estimated that the office would compile, edit and produce an
average of 12–15 stories a day, with five or six stories on a slow day and up to 30 on a
busy day.
Following the merger of Reuters and Thomson in 2008, the newswire has
significantly refocused its editorial policy, aiming to deliver more financial news. This
shift is an attempt to meet the needs of the majority of their clients, who work in the
financial sector and subscribe to the newswire for its live data and news on markets
and commodities (rather than traditional news media clients). David Clarke, the
deputy bureau chief, described the new mix of content:
We’re still providing video, pictures, text for media clients, i.e. newspapers,
magazines, radio stations, TV stations around the world. But the stories
we would focus on, prioritise more, are the ones which have more interest
to the real-time clients [those with live update screens providing financial
data].
This shift in news priorities has significant implications for the types of story that
Reuters produces (and thus, that all clients—including news media subscribers—
receive and reproduce) and it merits substantial further exploration in another forum,
where space permits. There is little doubt, however, that the new Thomson Reuters
continues to pride itself on its ‘hard news’ coverage—and, in East Africa, this
typically consists of breaking coverage on political developments, conflicts and
humanitarian disasters. Bureau chief Andrew Cawthorne noted that the decision to
cover the post-election violence extensively and deeply, with all available resources
throughout December and January 2007–08, was a ‘no-brainer’. In addition to its
clear political and humanitarian dimensions, the violence shook one of the strongest
economies in the region and had significant implications for investment, tourism and
trade.
Case Study: Covering the Post-election Crisis at Reuters
As an agency, Reuters occupies an ambiguous space between ‘insider’ and ‘outsider’
in Nairobi, reflecting the divergent positionalities of the journalists themselves. At
certain times, journalists emphasised their insider status, especially in contrast to
temporary ‘parachute’ journalists; this was proudly displayed as giving privileged
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access to local knowledge and contacts. At other times, however, especially in the
middle of the crisis, to be too deeply embedded was clearly both personally difficult
and a journalistic liability. At such moments, the gap between non-Kenyan and local
journalists was at its widest, even as the locals desperately attempted to cling to their
sense of ‘balance’. The foreign dominance of the bureau and Reuters’ emphasis on
the needs of its international business clientele, however, meant that Kenyan voices
were continually sidelined under pressure.
In general, all the journalists in the Nairobi bureau believed that their status as
insiders—their permanent presence in Kenya, their local colleagues, and their deeper
local knowledge—significantly improved their reporting on the election crisis and
resulted in more nuanced and more consistent coverage. In this, they explicitly
defined their identity against visiting journalists, who had little local knowledge or
experience and whose treatment of the crisis was perceived to be more superficial.
Cawthorn felt that, in contrast to the Reuters journalists, these visitors were
overexcited, made false inferences and exaggerated the situation on the ground.
Describing a Sky News report, he said:
I mean, it was offensive stuff . . . It was like some guy had just got off a
plane, was sitting in Kibera with a load of hooded people with machetes—
you know, scraping the machetes along the ground, talking about the
number of the people they’d killed. And you know—because one goes to
Kibera often, you know that only one or two of them would’ve been killers
and the others were all peacocks. The real killers are not going to sit there
talking to the reporter.
Furthermore, after the violence had peaked, these parachute journalists left as
quickly as they had arrived, leading to discontinuous, ‘spotlight’ reporting of the
crisis. Patrick Muiruri, senior television producer at Reuters, noted that ‘they kept
playing old footage, the worst footage, after things had calmed down. Whereas we
do the footage that’s new everyday—so ours is more representative’.
In comparison with the dramatic, episodic and misleading reports of other
journalists, Reuters staff felt they were able to approach the issues from a number of
angles, discuss the manifestations of fighting around the country, and analyse the
core themes—for example, sidebars and interviews looking at issues such as ‘what is
inequality in Kenya?’ In this, both Kenyans and internationals at the bureau were
united as relative insiders.
Kenyan Voices in the Newsroom
As insiders, however, journalists were closer to the story, and their emotional
engagement threatened impartiality in the newsroom. For the Kenyans in the
Reuters bureau, the post-election violence was an extremely emotional and difficult
time to be a journalist. They were at greater risk when they left the office to report, as
they could be associated with one side of the conflict or another. Furthermore, many
found newsgathering and writing very difficult as the issues were so close to home
and were hurting the people and communities they cared about. Writing on someone
else’s conflict, including elsewhere in East Africa, is easy; writing on your own is
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challenging. Helen Nyambura-Mwaura, head economics correspondent at Reuters,
admitted:
When you write every day, like we do—‘15 people are killed in Somalia’—that’s
one thing and it’s fine. But when it’s your own country and your own people it’s
totally different. Totally and utterly different. It’s too hard.
Making it harder still, many of the Kenyans in the newsroom had very strong
political and personal feelings on the crisis itself, and they found it difficult to remain
impartial. Cracks emerged between those who supported ODM 4and those who
supported Kibaki. Muiruri described the tension:
It was completely obvious that everyone was on different sides. I’m Kikuyu, and
my mother rang me up in tears—my aunt’s house was burnt down. So I’m
angry, and I want to write a big critical rant about ODM. But then, another guy
here is talking to me and his friend’s house is burnt down on the other
side . . . my job was to kind of try and find a balance between that but it was
very hard.
Nyambura-Mwaura also identified strong divisions among staff:
There was a really big divide in the newsroom. There were those who thought
ODM and those who thought PNU was right. Basically, it was Kikuyu versus
everyone else . . . We would have discussions about coverage, they would say,
‘The election’s been stolen,’ and we would be saying, ‘that hasn’t been proven
yet’ . . . So despite journalist objectivity, we were all very emotional and taking
sides.
Despite the strain of these divisions, she claimed they did not have an adverse
impact on the stories: ‘We ended up being balanced, because of that split—
everyone was saying to each other all the time, ‘‘You have to put this side in’’’.
Faced with conflicting stances towards the fighting, the local journalists appealed
to the notion of balance to adjudicate their stories. Journalistic impartiality is
thus asserted as a resilient and internationally accepted goal; however, in actual
practice several of the Kenyan reporters echoed Ogola’s (2008) complaint that
the international coverage was sensationalist, self-serving and unsympathetic.
Standoffish impartiality had to be tempered by a genuine concern with local
needs.
International and Local Divides
Proximity to the crisis opened up a profound split within the newsroom between
Kenyan citizens and outside internationals regarding how the violence should be
covered; this reflected the difference of opinions that divided the local and
international media in Nairobi more generally. The Kenyan reporters felt that
international journalists should be more selective and cautious with what they
covered, and more reserved in the language they used. These objections were either
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not heard by the managerial staff, or were put to one side in the interest of more
dramatic news reporting.
In general, Cawthorne thought that Reuters did a fairly good job of avoiding the
worst of the tribal language in its reports and was fairly sensitive to the inflammatory
potential of news content: ‘Every meeting we had, every story we wrote, we were
aware of that [trying to avoid tribal language]’. However, he was still aware that
things could have been reported in a more nuanced way and, to some extent, that
this reflected the fact that the Western journalists in the office dominated the
editorial meetings and reporting decisions during the crisis: ‘We could have done
better. Afterwards when we had a big discussion, that became clear’.
Cawthorne believes that the Kenyans in the newsroom were unusually quiet owing
to the traumatic turn of events. In addition, time pressures meant that there was little
time to reflect or discuss the issues among the staff fully:
I couldn’t fuck around—if you’ll excuse me—when that was happening. I
couldn’t spend an hour to sit back and, let’s think about this, and coax out
people’s ideas. I was like, ‘Um, a church is burning with 33 people inside, we
need to urgently write about that: is this echoes of Rwanda, isn’t it echoes of
Rwanda?’ I mean, huge questions like that, and we were making split-second
judgements on them. And unfortunately, those hardened correspondents here,
we tended to dominate. I wanted to make the others speak up, and they weren’t.
Later on, they had a lot to say, an awful lot.
In normal day-to-day reporting at Reuters, Kenyan journalists have a high level of
involvement in decision-making about the stories and angles of reporting. Kenyans
run the morning news meetings, report fairly autonomously on their own beats, and
contribute to newsroom discussions. Cawthorne and Clarke both stated that Kenyan
journalists often suggested stories that they would not have thought of, or they
explained local events in a way that made them appreciate their significance. This led
to a ‘happy symbiosis’, he felt, between international news values and local
knowledge and concerns.
In the coverage of the election crisis, however, this symbiosis faltered. Despite
their significant numbers as journalists, Kenyans were completely absent from the
management level of the newswire. In practice, this meant that Kenyans did not run
shifts or oversee editorial decision-making. There was, furthermore, a state of
emergency in the newsroom and decisions were made swiftly, often without
discussion or consultation; the hierarchies of management became more visible, and
the Kenyan voices were sidelined. Just as crucially, the Kenyan journalists’ proximity
to the violence became a liability in reporting ‘hard’ news to Reuters’ clients, not an
asset. According to the norms of the organisation, this contrasted unfavourably with
the hardened distance of the traditional foreign correspondents.
Alternative Approaches
Was a more cohesive symbiosis possible in the Reuters bureau, one that combined
local news values—the empathetic concerns of ‘insiders’—and the international news
agenda, with its demand for big breaking stories? Some outlets found it was possible
to cover breaking ‘hard’ news in a way that was sensitive to local needs. Journalists
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at the Al Jazeera English bureau, for example, articulated a crisis-sensitive approach
to reporting. A British-born correspondent for Al Jazeera stated that it was very
important to the producers not to be provocative, and that this principle trumped
other notions of newsworthiness during the crisis reportage:
We tried very hard not to be inflammatory . . . I was anchoring, and I would
have to say to them [politicians]—during an interview—‘Look, you can’t talk
like that’ . . . I was interviewing William Ruto the night after the church burnt
down. I said, ‘You must condemn this atrocity’ and he was just replying ‘oh, the
police are always committing atrocities’—I told him, and made it clear, that he
was out of line saying that on television.
Whereas other journalists might have turned the interview into a dramatic piece
illustrating political animosity, Al Jazeera journalists described a pressing obligation
to desensationalise the statements. They were aware they were being followed
locally—Al Jazeera is available on free-to-air television in Kenya, and has a large
following—and felt like they had become actors in the crisis. As a new outlet
associated with the Middle East, its narrative for Africa is also nowhere nearly as
entrenched in colonial experience.
The synthesis between local concerns and international news values appears to be
a more established feature of the Al Jazeera network, partly due to the
demography of its reporters. Kenyan journalists are well integrated in day-to-day
reporting, and therefore seem to have had increased success in fighting basic
stereotypes in their coverage. Unlike the humanitarian paradigm so favoured by
many Western-oriented outlets (Kleinman and Kleinman, 1996), Al Jazeera English
seems to have more leeway to pursue nuanced stories. Its producers, too, have the
influence to push correspondents into relinquishing traditional hard news stories in
favour of more innovative angles. A British-born correspondent, for example,
recalls writing a report on soaring food prices. His instinct had been to go to the
slums and see how the food crisis was affecting Kenya’s poorest; however, his
(Kenyan) producer stopped him, saying, ‘Hang on—the crisis is affecting the
middle class too—let’s go to Nakumatt [a large supermarket chain] and see how
people are coping’. This intervention led to a report that showed a different side of
Kenya to an international audience, many of whom—after years of negative
reporting—may be literally unaware that Kenya has a middle class struggling with
the same inflated supermarket bills as people in the West. The people in these news
reports are like ‘us’—not foreign or ‘other’—and, as such, occupy a space that
encourages a response of empathy rather than mere sympathy. Roger Silverstone
(2007, p. 46) calls this the ‘proper distance’, and argues that it is essential if the
news media is to help foster an ethics of care, ‘a sense of the other sufficient not
just for reciprocity but for a duty of care, obligation and responsibility, as well as
understanding’.
Change at Reuters?
There are signs that things are slowly changing at the Reuters Nairobi bureau to
include more Kenyan voices in reporting. Helen Nyambura-Mwaura pointed out
that things are already better than they were:
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This place used to be a white British boys’ club. They were running
everything . . . Kenyans weren’t being paid as much, they weren’t given
responsibility or allowed to make decisions.
As a Kenyan journalist, she felt it was still harder to earn a permanent contract in the
company (it took her seven years to go from being a stringer to a salaried position)
but that things had improved, with Kenyan journalists more involved in the editorial
process and more equal wages.
There are also indications the Reuters Nairobi newsroom will increase the number
of Kenyan journalists it hires in the future, and even look to appoint its first Kenyan
bureau chief or deputy chief. Cawthorne stated:
We’re trying to shift the balance. There are far too many people like me and
David [Clarke] here running things. There’s no reason that Helen shouldn’t be
running the office. We’re really trying to make that shift . . . We want to
promote local voices . . . We would love to have a Number 1 and Number 2 of
each—we want the change, and that symbiosis.
These moves suggest positive change for neo-colonial critics, who have long
denounced the international news media’s tendency to speak on behalf of Africans,
rather than letting Africans speak for themselves. In particular, the integration of
Kenyan journalists into management may help to fight stereotypes in day-to-day
reporting, and encourage a wider range of local perspectives.
The potential for change should not be overstated, however, and the physical
inclusion of Kenyans is not a panacea. Although fairly autonomous in many ways,
the Nairobi Reuters bureau must report back with stories that the international and
African editors are looking for. These editors, in turn, are looking for news stories
that deliver their clients’ news needs.
Reuters does not have many of the financial and outlet structures that make
alternative modes of reporting possible at Al Jazeera English. Whereas the latter is
publicly funded and, interestingly, is quite unclear on the demographics of its
audience (described by one correspondent as an anarchic situation but ‘one that’s
quite nice’), Reuters exists in a tight market where it must consistently compete with
other newswires for clients. This competition is won and lost on the ability to break
the news fastest and most accurately; and there are no institutional rewards for news
that has the greatest respect for local needs or that incorporates the most conflict-
sensitive language. Furthermore, Reuters has an extensive knowledge of all its
(almost universally Western-based) clients and the editors know—or think they
know—exactly what news their clients want: fast and accurate breaking stories on
the events that move markets and affect political risk.
At the Reuters bureau, there is a range of incentives and pressures on journalists,
which encourage them to produce institutionally favoured reporting that meets client
needs. Journalists are given consistent feedback on which stories both the editors are
commissioning and which stories they like (indeed, contract journalists are only paid
if the story is taken by the organisation); Reuters receives direct feedback from
clients, and there are clear data on which stories were picked up by the international
press. Although more Kenyan journalists—especially in management—may have an
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impact on the content of some reports (e.g. curbing the most worrying stereotypical
portrayals), these constraints mean their influence will be restricted to a relatively
small range of pre-established, client-approved modes of reporting. There is
no reward for innovative or empathetic stories that deviate from these hard news
norms.
I asked Nyambura-Mwaura if things would change if she were in charge. She
replied:
No. Ultimately, we’ve still got to feed London and that’s the bottom line: I
could send them the story ‘20 people died in a car crash’ and they would still
come back with ‘20 people die every day in car crashes’. It’s very depressing.
African lives just don’t matter. I’ve learnt that . . . but it’s still horribly
depressing to know that nobody cares.
Conclusion
The post-election violence was an extreme and anomalous period for the reporters in
Nairobi, and interactions during that time do not reflect day-to-day reporting
processes in the Reuters bureau. However, this case study raises a number of
interesting and important issues regarding who exactly ‘speaks for Kenya’: it
highlights the potential difficulty for Kenyans writing as ‘insiders’ on their own
country, and the local criticisms that can arise of ‘outsiders’ perceived as
exploitatively pursuing their own professional gain. This would suggest that any
claims about the total dissolution of the ‘inside’/‘outside’ cultural dichotomy in the
era of global media are premature. Under pressure, it is evident that the dominance
of Western views and ‘traditional’ news values in the newsroom continues without
major challenge, not least because of the newswire’s pro-business orientation. A
more innovative, empathetic or advocacy-inclined position is inimical to the ‘hard
news’ demands of this client base.
None the less, there are signs that the newsroom is becoming more inclusive.
Although a revolution in Reuters’ position seems out of the question and local
dominance seems very distant, the idea of ‘whites’ dictating descriptions of Africa
seems increasingly unpalatable. If Kenyans are still subordinate, the space for debate
is at least open. It may be that a slow and sometimes uncomfortable synthesis is
emerging.
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Notes
1. In April 2008, Reuters was acquired by the consortium Thomson and became Thomson Reuters.
However, this paper follows near-universal custom and refers to the newswire as ‘Reuters’ throughout.
2. These are The Daily Telegraph, The Times, The Guardian, The Independent and The Financial Times.
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3. In the Guardian website archive, for example, a search of ‘Kenya’ in October and November 2007, prior
to the election violence, returns a result of approximately 50–60 articles per month. In January 2008,
there was four times that number—with 202 articles. In February 2008, the coverage remained high,
with 113. By March, it had dropped again to 61.
4. The size and composition of the news team fluctuates from day to day as stringers from the field come
and go and journalists follow stories in and out of the field. In the text and television sides of the
newsroom combined, there were on average eight full-time journalists and an additional eight stringers
in the office at the time of this research.
5. These are not listed as some journalists chose to speak off the record and the identity of their outlet
would make them easily recognisable.
6. Kenya, Uganda. Rwanda, Burundi, Eritrea, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Somalia, Somaliland, Tanzania,
Comoros, Madagascar, Mauritius and Seychelles. The bureau also provides supplementary reporting
on South Sudan and East Congo on an ad hoc basis, owing to their geographic proximity.
7. Each of the 14 countries covered has at least one stringer in the field; with more in the countries
perceived to be of greater financial or hard news significance. In total, Cawthorne noted an estimated 24
stringers in the text network, and a comparable number working for the TV side. These stringers range
from working nearly full time for the wire, through to those who file very occasionally.
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